Introduction
There existsa class of civil structureswhich have a wide variety of Uncertain loadings and are difficult to test at a system level,but must still possessa long life with minimal riskof failure. At the same time, these structuresmust not be excessively expensive or weighty. Because of the random characterof the uncertainties in both the loading and the capabilityof these structures, a probabilistic approach to design is warranted. The probabilistic discipline of structuralreliability has been developed in order to ensure safety and consistencyin structuraldesigns and in the civilengineering design codes.1"2Recently,structural reliability techniqueshave also been appliedto aerospaceengineering components, such as the turbopump blades of the space shuttlemain engine. 3"5 Here, the random variablesof concern have focused on the constitutive relationships and properties of the structure.In thisstudy, a new aerospace applica-tion of structural reliability techniques is presented, where the applied forces as well as the structure depend on many probabilistic variables. This application is the plume impingement loading of the Space Station Freedom Photovoltaic Arrays.
When the space shuttle approaches Space Station Freedom itmust brake and maneuver to come to a complete stop relativeto Space Station Freedom. This is achieved through the use of the shuttle's primary reactioncontrolsystem (PRCS) jets,each of which delivers about 800 Ib of force. The plume from these jets expands quickly in space so that a low density plume impinges upon the photovoltaic (PV) arrays (Fig. 1) .
However, since the area of the photovoltaicarrays is so large (110 ftby 39 ft, Fig. 2) ,thesmall plume forcescan cause significant loading in the photovoltaicarray. Of particulaxconcern isthe bending moment at the base of the mast, which can be very large because of the mast's long length.
Calculating
the exact transient loads which result from plume impingement forcing is quite difficult because of the many random variables which govern the analysis. These random variables are the shuttle position, the shuttle orientation, the space station orientation, space station thermal deformation, photovoltaic array mast twist, feathered angle accuracy, predicted plume forces accuracy, the dynamics excited by a particular approach to Space Station Freedom (essentially dynamic load factor), modeling uncertainty, and the array mast strength uncertainty.
Most of these variables define the geometric orientation of the space shuttle with respect to Space Station Freedom and, therefore, define the amount of plume exhaust impinging upon the arrays.
Allof these random variablesare independent and it is highly unlikely that all of their worst case values would coincidein time. Nonetheless,a setof transient dynamic analysesaxe currentlyperformed, using forcing functionswhich areselectedin an attempt to bound the worst possibleapplied forces. The resulting internal loads are compared to the limit load capabilityof the structure.Results from the referencedwork indicates that at the permanently manned configuration(PMC, Fig. 1 ), the bending moment applied to photovoltaic array mast exceeds the limit load by 10 percent. This attempt to bound the worst possible loading has been made the baseline for structural design.
This study demonstrates the use of structural reliability techniques to compute the probability of failure of the array masts, with loading governed by random inputs and an uncertain structural capability.
The probability of failure during a single shuttle berthing approach to PMC and during the lifetime of the arrays will be presented. This work will be important in deciding whether or not the worst came deterministic transient mxalysis discussed above is appropriate. This work lays the foundatioms for a plume impingement analysis methodology that is probability based and one that produces a realistic, stud still reasonably conservative, loads assessment. A cost analysis based on the probability of f_lure is also presented.
Although plume impingement loading is a concern for the entire space station, this study focuses on the bending moment in the PV array masts.
In particular, the arrays on the port side ( Fig. 1 ) are emphasized because they are the most heavily loaded. The methodology developed is useful for these arrays, and for all plume impingement loads analyses and stage configurations of the space station.
Theoretical Overview
Two methods of performing probabilityanalysisare
presented. The f'mat is conventional Monte Carlo simulationwhich produces a probabilitydistribution for an output, bmmd upon statistical trials of a sequence of random vectors. This method is easilyimplemented, unfortunately,itrequiresa largenumbdr of simulations to accuratelypredicttheoutput probability distribution.
The second method presented is a first-order secondmoment scheme introduced by Hasofer and Lind.s This method uses the probabilitydistributions of the random variables in the limit state function to produce the probabilityof failure. In addition to the probability subjectspresented,system reliability and cost analysis are brieflydiscussed.
distributionfor the output can be accurately defined. To properlydefinea probabilityof Pf willtake at least four orders of magnitude more simulations than 1/Pf in order to achieve a coefficient of variationless than 1 percent. Therefore, for Pf = 10 -3 (,-,$u), 10 7 simulations axe needed to get the coefficient of variation of Pf to less than 1percent. Note that Eq. (2) is not a practical formula since Pf, actual is not known.
First-OrderSecond-Moment Methods

Monte Carlo Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation is based upon running many simulations However, a cost must be associated with each conse-quence of a failure.Given C I sad C g of a design isgiven by,
Note that C F ismultipliedby the probabilityof failure to account for the factthat C F may never be required.
The optimum design is found by minimising C T-
The curve of C T will always be concave up if an increase in C I causes a decrease in PC Therefore a minimum will exist.
Methodology
Because of the complicated laws of physics governing jet exhaust in a vacuum, it was not practical to include the necessary equations of the problem physics in the limit state functions. Therefore, the conventional Monte Carlo approach was chosen to create the applied plume A descriptionof how the mean and variance of the variablesin Eq. (5)were determined follows.
Monte Carlo Calculationof Loads Distribution
Previous loads analyses indicate that the port inboard arrays are the ones critically loaded by plume impingement. Therefore, thisstudy willfocus on these two arrays: PIU (port inboard upper} and PIL (port inboard lower} (Fig.1) . These arrays axe in their optimal feathering position,which is defined as the location of the a and _ joints that minimize the plume impingement loads. Figure I shows the arrays in theirfeatheredorientations. The shuttle is uniformly likely to be anywhere within this cone, and it is assumed that there is a 5 percent chance that the pilots will exceed the limits of the cone and that the likelihood of being a distance outside the cone decreases linearly to zero (Fig. 5 ). For the nominal approach, one other restriction is applied:
Two different
Only the port halfof the cone isused since the shuttle willonly firetowards the port side ifitis on the port side. The position of the shuttle within the cone of operations istwo random variables:Distance from the cone centerline and the angle on the cone.
The shuttle orientation is maintained by a digital autopilot which has _2°deadband, which means that the shuttle can temporarily reach maximum rotations larger than ±2 e. It is assumed that the distribution of shuttle orientation about any of its three axes is normal and that the deadband is at 2_r on a normal distribution ( Fig. 6 ). With this distribution, there is a 0.1 percent chance that the shuttle will exceed q-S°of rotation.
The orientation of the shuttle with respect to Space
Station Freedom is three random variables: X, Y, and Z shuttle rotations.
The space stationorientationis maintained by an
automatic controlsystem of controlmoment gyros with backup by a reactioncontrolsystem. Since the control authority of these are low, it is not clear that Space Station Freedom can remain within its deadbands of q-Is. Therefore, the deadband is considered to be the l_r positionon a normal distribution (Fig.7) . This makes the distributionof the three space station axes identical to that of the shuttle{Fig.6). The orientation of the space station is three random variables: X, Y, and Z space stationrotations.
As the space stationorbits the Earth it undergoes thermal deformations as differentsides ace lighted.
Early indicationsare that the deformation may be as large as "4-5°from the center to the end of the truss. This is the maximum about each axis. The likelihood of a particulardeformation is given by a normal distribution with 5a as the $# deviation (Fig.8) . The thermal deformation of Space StationFreedom isthree random variables: X, Y, and Z space station truss distortions.
Also considered isthe design toleranceon the array mast tiptwist. Specifications statethat thismay be up to 3°. This twist isassumed to be normally distributed about the perfectdesign with Se being the 3a deviation (Fig.9) . The mast tiptwist isone random variable.
There is approximately 30 percent9 uncertainty in the current equationsI0 used to derive plume impingement forces.To includethisuncertaintyin the analysis, another random variablerepresentingthisuncertaintyis multipliedto the dynamic results.This factoris modeled as being normally distributed about 1.0 with a standard deviation of 0.1 (Fig.10) . In this way the plume physics istreated as one random variable.
As mentioned earlier,the PV arrays are being featheredto minimise plume impingement loads. However,thisisnot dynamic feathering, so one positionfor the a and _ joints has been found and these angles are held during the entire approach. There is some uncertaintyin these angles due to many factors, among which are the possiblejoint locking locations,uncertainty about the on-orbit position of the joints,and dynamic twisting.Therefore, the featherangles cannot be guaranteed to be perfect, so a distribution is assumed. The designerssuggest that the 3¢ values are The element of the photovoltaic array which isthe most critical for loads is the mast. The cause of this criticality isthe mast's long length. Even a small load appliedonto the blanketsistransferred, through the top blanket boxes, onto the top of the mast. This small force causes a large moment at the base of the mast.
The mast itself is a folding truss with four longerons (Fig. 20) . There axe battens and other components which hold the longerons together. Because of its deployability,there axe additional components which make the mast a complicated structure, as isillustrated in Fig. 21 .
Despite the factthat the array mast iscomplex, its primary failure mechanism isclassical Euler buckling of the longeron, 12 as isshown in Fig.22 . When the entire mast is placed into bending about its neutral axis, the moment forces longerons into compression and tension ( Fig. 23) . When the bending is in a plane 45°from the face of the mast, then, in each bay, two longerons axe in the neutral plane, one is in tension, and one is in compression.
If the compression load due to bending exceeds the Euler buckling load, Per, that longeron will then buckle. It is the buckling of the longerons in compression that defines the design limit load of the entire mast. The plane 45°from the face is weakest plane of the mast. For bending in the plane of the face of the mast, the mast is q_'times stronger.
The reason for this is that there are two longerons taking load in compression while the distance from the neutral axis to the longerons is reduced by q_.
Any longeron in compression throughout the entire length of the mast may fall,but the applied load is greatestat the base and decreasesin each bay up the length of the mast. The probabilityof failure must be calculatedfor each longeron. These failuremodes axe independent and so the mast may be represented as a series system.
The overall probability of failure is then calculated using Eq.
(3).
It should be noted that failure modes other than longeron buckling exist in the photovoltaic array mast. These failure modes were not considered at this time.
The required design information to analyze these failure modes in detail was not available. It is known, however, that these failure modes have higher critical loads than the critical load for longeron buckling. 13 It is worth noting that the empirical factors used in the aerospace industry to define a structural design limit load14are roughly equivalent to the -3_ strength based on a probability distribution.
Results
Load Distribution
The nominal and NormZ breakout load distributions were computed separately based on 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations.The resulting distributions ofthe weak axis moments are shown in Figs. 24 to 27 . In these figures, the data points arethe resultsof the simulationsand the curves are the distributionsused to model the data.
These parameters of the distributionsare detailed in Table 1 . The type of distribution was determined by plottingthe resultson normal and log-normal distribution paper. The breakout maneuvers produced lognormal distributions and surprisingly the right sidesof the nominal approach produced normal distributions.
The distributions chosen for the nominal approach only match the right sideof the data because of the odd shape of the data. This odd shape is due to the fact that at about 20 ft out, the shuttle isedge on to the PIU array. Therefore,there are many points at which the Y-burn loads on the array are near zero. Insideof 20 ft,the Y-burn plumes one face of the arrays and outsideof 20 ftthe Y-burn plumes the other face. This crossovereffect makes itimpossibleto match a standard distributionto the results. However, thisshould not effect the resultssignificantly sincethe right side of the curve will dominate the probabilityof failureanalysis and thissideof the curve matches the data well.
Strength Distribution
Three mast designs were considered,each of which represents three discretedesigns of the Space Station Freedom Photovoltaic Array. The design limit loads of the three masts analyzed were 8300, 30,700, and 48,500 in.-Ib.The calculatedmeans and coefficients of variationfor thesethree masts are shown in Table 2 . A plot of the strength distributionof the 48,500 in.-Ib mast is shown in Fig.28 . This is the current space stationphotovoltaic array mast design. The PIU and the PIL mast were given the same distribution.
Probabilityof Failure and System Reliability
The probability of failure of each longeron in both the PIU and the PIL photovoltaic arrays was calculated. Theprobabilityoffailureof eitherarraymastover theentirelife of Space StationFreedom wasalsocomputed.It wasassumed that a breakout would occur on every approach, which is likely very conservative, but no data exists upon which to make a better assumption.
The total number of approaches to Space Station
Freedom over its entire life will be about 120. The lifetime probability is given by, Fig. 29 (normalized by Co) .
The cost of failurewas also estimated. A scenario was createdwhich would yield a conservativecost estimate for the failureinvolved. Because singlelongeron buckling was used u the failurepoint, which is not a catastrophic failure, a catastrophic scenario was not created. The scenario developed, therefore,assumed single longeron buckling. If this longeron buckled it would be likelythat an elbow or corner fittingwould alsofail.Ifthisoccurred,array retractionmight not be possible. Since the photovoltaic arrays are to be replaced periodically, when their solar cells wear out, part of the replacement process consists of retracting the old arrays, and returning them to Earth in the space shuttle.
There would be a cost associated with a complicated array retrieval. An estimate for this cost is 2.5Co, although this cost is not based upon C O. The probability of failure of each array was multiplied by the cost of failure to identify the expected cost of failure.
A plot of these values is shown in Fig. 29 {normalised by Co).
Finally, these sets of values were added together to compute total normalized cost using Eq. (4) , and were also plotted in Fig. 29. Assuming that total cost 
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